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Ten things I don’t like about you (. . .until tomorrow)
1 Introduction
It is well known that the interpretation of sentences in which negation appears above certain
verbs like ‘think’ and ‘want’ is typically stronger than expected. When negated, these
predicates generally license an inference not just that the individual in question fails to have
a positive attitude towards the content in question, but also that they have the corresponding
negative attitude towards the content (Horn 1978 among many others). For instance, a
sentence like (1-a) is generally interpreted in the same way as (1-b):
(1) a. James doesn’t think that Marie will be hired.
b.  James thinks that Marie will not be hired.
The traditional name for this phenomenon is ‘neg-raising’.1 Neg-raising readings are
generally the most prominent, but not the only, reading available; thus e.g. (1-a) could be
followed up with ‘He doesn’t think think that she will not be hired either; he just doesn’t
know whether she will be’, in which case (1-a) will clearly not be interpreted in the same
way as (1-b). If we combine a standard Hintikkan semantics for neg-raising predicates like
‘think’ with a classical treatment of negation, we predict that a sentence like (1-a) will only
1 ‘Neg-raising’ as a name suggests a syntactic analysis, but we will follow the recent literature in using this as a
name for the phenomenon without suggesting a particular analysis of it. Strong NPI licensing is sometimes
treated as definitive of neg-raising, but we will assume the more traditional and simpler definition: neg-raising
is simply the phenomenon of certain predicates licensing unexpectedly strong inferences when negated:
‘the collapsing (Zusammenfall) of the distinction between contrary and contradictory readings of negation’
(Horn 1989). Some in the recent literature have defined neg-raising more specifically as instances in which
certain predicates ‘when negated. . .are preferentially − but not necessarily − interpreted as having semantic
scope over negation’ (Homer 2015). This definition in general aligns with the one above, but it is too narrow
for our purposes, since the cases we will put forward are precisely ones in which the stronger inference
obtained is not equivalent to one in which negation takes low scope. But definitions like Homer’s are, we
think, already more restrictive than would be accepted on reflection by most in this literature, which recognizes
that attitude predicates under negative quantifiers (like ‘few’ or ‘none’) give rise to neg-raising readings
(Gajewski 2007, Romoli 2013 among others; see also section 6 below). Adopting a relatively broad definition
of the phenomenon in question makes it possible to investigate, as we will do here, whether this phenomenon
constitutes a theoretically natural class without prejudging the question of whether neg-raised attitude verbs
can always be paraphrased with a low scope negation, and whether they always license strong NPIs.
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have an agnostic reading, and do not account for its stronger neg-raising reading (on which
it licenses the inference to (1-b)). Accounting for neg-raising is an enduring challenge at the
intersection of semantics, syntax, and pragmatics.
As is well-known, neg-raising is not possible with all attitude predicates. For instance,
‘is certain’ interacts with negation in the way we would expect from a classical point of
view: (2-a) has only an agnostic reading, not a neg-raising reading (which would license the
inference to (2-b)).
(2) a. James is not certain that Marie will be hired.
b. 6 James is certain that Marie will not be hired.
Another crucial feature of neg-raising predicates is that, when negated, they generally
license strong Negative Polarity Items (NPIs), like ‘until tomorrow’ or ‘in years’. By contrast,
non-neg-raising predicates do not license strong NPIs (Lakoff 1969 among others):
(3) a. James doesn’t think that Marie will arrive until tomorrow.
b. *James isn’t certain that Marie will arrive until tomorrow.
Traditional theories of strong NPIs and neg-raising are formulated to predict a tight connec-
tion between the two phenomenon. In particular, most approaches predict that neg-raised
predicates always license strong NPIs.
More recently, however, Gajewski (2011) and Chierchia (2013) have proposed a theory
of strong NPIs on which, at least in principle, they may fail to be licensed by neg-raising
constructions. The gist of the idea is that strong NPIs, like all NPIs, are licensed only in
downward monotonic environments. However, the former, unlike the latter, are sensitive
to non-truth-conditional meanings. That is, they require that monotonicity properties are
calculated taking into account not only at-issue content, but also presuppositions and scalar
implicatures. Going back to the contrast in (3), the reason why (3-a) but not (3-b) licenses
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strong NPIs is because the latter gives rise to a positive implicature (viz. that John leaves it
open that Marie will arrive . . . ) which disrupts the downward monotonicity of the context
in which ‘until tomorrow’ appears. This means that in this theory the alignment between
neg-raised predicates and strong NPI licensing is only indirect: the former generally license
the latter because, unlike the latter, they do not give rise to non-truth conditional meanings
which disrupt monotonicity. But nothing in this approach excludes the possibility of there
being a predicate which is neg-raising but gives rise to a presupposition or implicature
which disrupts strong NPI licensing. In fact, given that non-truth conditional meanings are
pervasive in natural language, one might indeed expect there to be such a class of predicates
on this approach.
In this squib, we show that there is indeed a class of predicates which give rise to neg-
raising inferences but do not license strong NPIs: namely, factive emotives like ‘appreciate’,
‘be glad’, ‘be happy’, and ‘like’. This is a striking fact which we believe provides support
for the Gajewski-Chierchia theory. We also point to some challenges this class of predicates
poses for traditional approaches to neg-raising, and make a suggestion about how these
might be overcome in a semantic approach to neg-raising.2
2 Gajewski and Chierchia on strong NPIs
We begin by briefly rehearsing Gajewski (2011), Chierchia (2013)’s theory of strong NPIs,
which is based on the idea that strong NPIs are sensitive to non-truth conditional meanings.
In brief, the idea is that both weak and strong NPIs require downward entailing environments;
but that while we can ignore presuppositions and implicatures in calculating monotonicity
properties relevant for the licensing of weak NPIs, we cannot do so when calculating
2 Kiparsky & Kiparsky (1971: p.19) claim that neg-raising and factivity are incompatible. But they do so because
they assume a syntactic approach to neg-raising—which, as we discuss below, is indeed incompatible with
treating ‘like’-verbs as neg-raisers. We think it is, however, fruitful to at least explore the possibility that
appearances here are not misleading, and that ‘like’-verbs are indeed neg-raisers, and should be treated in a
unifed way with other neg-raisers. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for discussion on this point.
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monotonicity properties relevant to the licensing of strong NPIs. To illustrate, consider the
contrast between (4) and (5), which shows that a strong NPI like ‘until tomorrow’ can appear
in the scope of negation like in (4), but cannot appear felicitously in downward entailing
contexts like the restrictor of a universal quantifier in (5).
(4) Mary won’t leave until tomorrow.
(5) *Every student who will leave until tomorrow will miss the class.
The relevant difference between (4) and (5) is that the latter has a presupposition that the
intersection of the domain of quantification and the restrictor clause is non-empty; and
that if this presupposition is taken into account in calculating monotonicity properties, the
restrictor of the quantifier in (5) is no longer downward entailing. Schematically, the two
components of the meaning of (5) are in (6-a) and (6-b):
(6) a. presupposition: ∃x ∈ D[[[will leave until tomorrow]](x)]
b. assertion: ∀x ∈ D[[[will leave until tomorrow]](x)→ [[will miss the class]](x)]
Gajewski (2011) and Chierchia (2013) argue that in evaluating monotonicity for the purpose
of licensing strong NPIs, we must look at implicated and presupposed content in addition
to asserted content. And, crucially, if we do this in calculating the monotonicity of the
restrictor of ‘every’, we do not have a downward entailing environment: pSomething is p
and everything which is p is qq does not entail pSomething is (p and r) and everything which
is (p and r) is qq.
3 Neg-raising and strong NPIs
Let us turn now to neg-raising. Consider again the contrast in (3), repeated here:
(3) a. James doesn’t think that Marie will arrive until tomorrow.
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b. *James isn’t certain that Marie will arrive until tomorrow.
Given Gajewski-Chierchia’s approach, what explains the fact that strong NPIs are licensed
in the scope of the attitude predicate in (3-a) but not in (3-b) is a difference between them in
their scalar implicatures or presuppositions. Notice that a sentence like (7-a) generally gives
rise to the implicature in (7-b), while (8-a) does not, and instead gives rise to the neg-raising
inference in (8-c) (cf. Romoli 2013).
(7) a. John isn’t certain that Mary was here.
b.  John leaves open that Mary was here.
(8) a. John doesn’t think that Mary was here.
b. 6 John leaves open that Mary was here.
c.  John doesn’t leave open that Mary was here.
In Gajewski-Chierchia’s theory, the question of whether strong NPIs are licensed in the
scope of the attitude predicates in (7) and (8) is the question of whether those attitude
predicates, together with their scalar implicatures and presuppositions, create downward
entailing environments. It is easy to see that the possibility inference of ‘certain’ disrupts
the downward entailingness of its scope. Abstractly, in the case of ‘not certain’ we have an
environment like p¬ j[__]∧♦ j[__]q, whereas in the case of ‘doesn’t think’ we have instead
an environment like p¬ j[__]q. For essentially the same reason as in the case of ‘every’
above, __ is not a downward entailing environment in the former, whereas it obviously is in
the latter.
Note that in this system, strong NPI licensing does not follow directly from the fact
that a predicate has a neg-raising inference. The connection is rather more general and
more indirect: in particular, while the neg-raising inference of neg-raising predicates leaves
the downward entailingness of the environment intact, the existential inference typical of
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non-neg-raising predicates disrupts it, so that only the former license strong NPIs in their
complements.
4 ‘Like’-verbs
Abstractly speaking, however, nothing in the Gajewski-Chierchia approach excludes the
existence of a neg-raising predicate which doesn’t license strong NPIs. In this section, we’ll
argue that some emotive factives have just this behavior. In particular, consider predicates
like ‘like’, ‘be glad’, ‘be happy’, ‘appreciate’, and so on, with propositional complements.
Unlike most factive attitude predicates, these are neg-raising predicates in the sense that the
typical interpretation of a sentence like (9-a) is not one on which Fred is indifferent about
Marie being hired, but rather one on which Fred is unhappy about Marie being hired:3
(9) Fred {doesn’t like/doesn’t appreciate/isn’t happy/isn’t glad} that Marie was hired.
Just as for other neg-raising predicates, an indifference reading of (9) is possible; it can
be brought out by following up (9) with something like ‘He doesn’t dislike that she was
hired yesterday either; he is indifferent about it’. But this reading is certainly not the most
prominent interpretation: on the most natural interpretation, (9) is rather felt to express that
Fred dislikes that Marie was hired.
Crucially, however, these predicates do not license strong NPIs when negated, unlike
the standard neg-raising predicates discussed above, as witnessed by the contrast between
(10-a) versus (10-b) and (10-c):4
(10) a. *Fred doesn’t like that Marie has seen her mother in years.
b. Fred likes that Marie hasn’t seen her mother in years.
3 This observation is due to Horn 1989: p. 341: “I don’t like it that he was reelected’ can convey (by litotes) a
strong negative reaction to his re-election (= I dislike it. . . ), but it cannot convey satisfaction with his defeat.’
We do not know of subsequent discussion of this point or its bearing on the debate about neg-raising.
4 Thanks to Chris Collins and Paul Postal (p.c.) for first bringing this point to our attention.
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c. Fred doesn’t think that Marie has seen her mother in years.
At first glance, then, our class of emotive factives—call them ‘like’-verbs as a shorthand—
seem to witness exactly the theoretical possibility that Gajewski-Chierchia’s account makes
available: namely, neg-raising predicates which do not license strong NPIs.
5 Motivating the inference
Before exploring Gajewski-Chierchia’s predictions about our data in more detail, we will do
more to motivate treating ‘like’-verbs as neg-raisers. First, we argued above that, intuitively,
(11-a) is generally interpreted as (11-b):
(11) a. Fred doesn’t like that Marie was hired yesterday.
b. Fred dislikes that Marie was hired yesterday.
However, given that the claim in (11-b) is stronger than the literal meaning in (11-a), the
latter is always compatible with a situation in which the former is true, so we have to be
cautious before concluding that the reading in (11-b) is really there (see Gajewski 2005,
Meyer & Sauerland 2009 for related discussion). The licensing of strong NPIs is often used
as a diagnostic reinforcing the existence of neg-raising. However in this case obviously we
cannot use that diagnostic, since we are precisely calling into question whether neg-raising
predicates always license strong NPIs.
While we think that the inference from (11-a) to (11-b) is intuitively clear, we will put
forward one further argument that this inference is robust, building on Chierchia et al. 2012.
Consider a sentence like (12), which embeds (11-a) in the first disjunct.
(12) Either Fred doesn’t like that Marie was hired yesterday or he doesn’t care.
If the first disjunct had only a weak indifference reading, then the second disjunct here
would entail the first. If the second disjunct entailed the first, however, then we would expect
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(12) to be a violation of Hurford’s constraint (Hurford 1974), and to strike us as being as
infelicitous as (13):
(13) #Either John is in France or he is in Paris.
The fact that (12) is felicitous thus suggests that (11-a) indeed does have a reading on which
it communicates something more than indifference, and instead communicates what (11-b)
does. If (11-a) does indeed have such a reading, then this of course accounts for the felicity
of (12), since (11-b) neither entails nor is entailed by ‘John doesn’t care about Marie being
hired yesterday’.
6 Universal inferences and partial cyclicity
Even if ‘like’-verbs give rise to stronger readings than might be expected, some might still
resist counting them as neg-raisers. In particular, those who take the licensing of strong
NPIs to be diagnostic of neg-raising could argue that ‘like’-verbs are not neg-raisers; as we
will see below, anyone who goes in for a syntactic approach to neg-raising must likewise
argue that these are not neg-raisers. They might instead point out that when these predicates
take nominal complements they give rise to an inference sometimes called ‘inferences to the
antonym.’ That is, a sentence like (14-a) gives rise to the inference in (14-b).
(14) a. John doesn’t like apples.
b.  John dislikes apples.
There are various accounts of the inference in (14-b), so one might argue that the sentential
cases above are not cases of neg-raising after all, and instead should be treated as inferences
to the antonym (Krifka 2007; see also Heim 2008, Ruytenbeek et al. 2017)
We do not have a decisive argument against this response. But we think there are reasons
to generalize in the other direction: that is, to give a unified account both of neg-raising and of
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the phenomenon in (14). Part of the motivation for this is general considerations of theoretical
simplicity. Part comes from the fact that, as we will see presently, the Gajewski-Chierchia
approach already predicts the lack of strong NPI licensing under negated ‘like’-verbs. Here
we will make another point, which is that inferences to the antonym share some characteristic
patterns with neg-raising. For instance, like neg-raisers, inferences to the antonym give
rise to universal inferences under negative quantifiers (as (15)) and (partial) cyclicity (as in
(18)), just like the corresponding ‘like’-verbs in (16) and (19), respectively, and just like the
classical neg-raisers in (17) and (20), respectively.5
(15) Nobody likes apples.
(15)  Everybody doesn’t like apples.
(16) a. Nobody likes that Marie was hired.
b.  Everybody dislikes that Marie was hired.
(17) a. Nobody thinks that Marie was hired.
b.  Everybody thinks that Marie wasn’t hired.
(18) a. I don’t think that John likes apples.
b.  I think that John dislikes apples.
(19) a. I don’t think that John likes that Marie was hired.
b.  I think that John dislikes that Marie was hired.
(20) a. I don’t think that John thinks that Marie was hired.
b.  I think that John thinks that Marie wasn’t hired.
These parallelisms are, of course, only suggestive; but they do provide some evidence that
5 See Gajewski 2007, Romoli 2013 among others for discussion of these cases with classical neg-raising
predicates. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting these data to us.
9
what we have here is a unified phenomenon. And below we will show how a unified account
can in fact be given.
7 Gajewski-Chierchia on ‘like’-verbs
We show now that the Gajewski-Chierchia approach to strong NPI licensing in fact precisely
predicts that neg-raised ‘like’-verbs do not license strong NPIs. The central reason for this is
that ‘like’-verbs are factive: they presuppose the truth of their complement. For instance (as
standard projection tests will confirm), (21) presupposes that Marie was hired.
(21) John likes that Marie was hired.
And this factivity presupposition disrupts the downward monotonicity of the environment
in which the strong NPI appears. If we ignore its presupposition, then (22-a) is downward
entailing in its scope.6 But once we take into account the presupposition of ‘like’ in cal-
culating its monotonicity, as in (22-b), we do not have a downward entailing environment
anymore, and strong NPIs are predicted not to be licensed.
(22) a. ¬likes f (__)
b. ¬likes f (__)∧__
Putting things more intuitively, ‘Fred doesn’t like that Marie was hired yesterday’ intuitively
does not entail ‘Fred doesn’t like that (Marie was hired yesterday and Jane was hired
yesterday)’, since the latter presupposes something that the former doesn’t, namely that
Jane was hired yesterday. So, if we take into account presuppositions in calculating the
monotonicity properties relevant to the licensing of strong NPIs, the scope of ‘doesn’t like’
6 We assume an upward entailing semantics for ‘like’ which would make its negation downward entailing.
See von Fintel 1999 for discussion in particular of the case of ‘be glad’, which can be extended to ‘like’,
‘appreciate’, and their kin. On the other hand, if we adopt a non-upward entailing semantics for this attitude
predicates, then this could provide an independent explanation of why their negations will not license strong
NPIs, though see Rothschild 2006 and Chemla et al. 2011 for discussion of NPI licensing in non-monotonic
contexts.
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is not downward entailing. Thus, if we follow Gajewski and Chierchia, we predict that
strong NPIs are not licensed in the scope of negated ‘like’-verbs. This makes them unlike
standard neg-raising predicates like ‘think’, which are not factive, and thus do not have a
presupposition which blocks downward monotonicity in a parallel way.
This is, we think, a striking point in favor of Gajewski-Chierchia’s theory. That theory
opens up a theoretical possibility (one not to our knowledge heretofore discussed), namely
that we could have neg-raising predicates which are do not license strong NPIs, if those
neg-raising predicates have presuppositions or implicatures which prevent their scope from
being downward entailing. This possibility seems indeed to be realized by ‘like’-verbs.
8 Syntactic neg-raising
This is all to the good for Gajewski and Chierchia’s theory of strong NPIs. We haven’t
yet said anything about how to actually account for the neg-raising inferences of negated
‘like’-verbs. In the rest of the paper, we will turn to this topic and we will show that while
it is not clear how to provide a unified account for the cases above within a syntactic
approach to neg-raising, a semantic approach (Gajewski 2007, Romoli 2013), combined
with a Gajewksi-Chierchia theory of strong NPIs, can provide such an account.
The syntactic approach to neg-raising originated in Fillmore 1963 and Horn 1971
and was recently taken up and revived by Collins & Postal (2014, 2017). The basic idea
is that a sentence like (23-a), on its neg-raising reading, has at some level of syntactic
representation a negation actually present in the embedded clause, and that this level of
syntactic representation feeds into semantic interpretation. This negation then moves out
and appears in the main clause.
(23) a. James doesn’t think that Marie will be hired.
b. James NEG thinks that [Marie will 〈NEG〉 be hired]
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The non-neg-raising readings are those where the negation is interpreted in the same place it
appears in surface form. The syntactic approach is generally linked to a theory on which
strong NPIs require a local licensor; the silent low negation acts as this licensor for neg-
raising readings (Linebarger 1987 among others; see Gajewski 2005, 2007, Romoli 2013
for critical discussion).7
This approach cannot be extended to account for the neg-raising behavior of ‘like’-
verbs. The first problem is that this kind of approach does not, as far as we can tell, have
the resources to explain why negated ‘like’-verbs do not license strong NPIs. The second
problem is much more basic, and is one of truth-conditional adequacy. On this approach,
superficially high-negation neg-raising sentences are predicted to be semantically equivalent
(on their default readings) to their low-negation counterparts. If we were to extend this
approach to ‘like’-verbs, then a sentence like (24-a) is predicted to have a syntactic level of
representation like (24-b) where negation is interpreted in its lower position. Thus (24-a)
(on its neg-raising interpretation) and (24-c) are predicted to be semantically equivalent:
(24) a. Fred doesn’t like that Marie was hired yesterday.
b. Fred NEG like that [Marie was 〈NEG〉 hired yesterday]
c. Fred likes that Marie was not hired yesterday.
But his is plainly wrong: (24-a) is not equivalent to (24-c) on any reading. The problem at
a theoretical level is that these predicates presuppose the truth of their complement. That
is, (24-a) suggests that Marie was hired yesterday. However, if negation is in the embedded
clause for the purposes of semantic interpretation, we would expect the presupposition
of (24-a) to include that negation: i.e. to presuppose the opposite of what it appears to
presuppose, i.e. to presuppose that Marie was not hired yesterday.
7 Arguments for the syntactic approach also come from cases that appear to be island effects. See Collins &
Postal 2014, 2017 for further discussion; for some arguments against the syntactic approach see Romoli 2013
and Zeijlstra 2017.
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A syntactic approach to neg-raising thus cannot be extended to account for the behavior
of ‘like’-verbs. Defenders of the syntactic approach can, of course, maintain that, superficial
similarities aside, the behavior of negated ‘like’-verbs should not be assimilated to neg-
raising. We cannot say anything to rule out this option definitively. A unified approach
should, however, be prefered if possible. And as we will see presently, a semantic approach
to neg-raising, coupled with the Gajewski-Chierchia theory of strong NPIs, provides just
such an option.
9 Semantic neg-raising
The semantic approach to neg-raising treats it as arising from an excluded middle inference
of neg-raising predicates. This inference can be derived either as a presupposition (Bartsch
1973, Heim 2000, Gajewski 2005, 2007, Homer 2015) or scalar implicature (Romoli 2013,
Bervoets 2014).8 The idea is that a sentence like ‘James thinks that Marie will be hired’,
schematized as pthink j(p)q, gives rise to the excluded middle, or opinionatedness, inference
(presupposition/implicature) in pthink j(p)∨ think j(¬p)q (which we can paraphrase as
‘James has an opinion as to whether Marie will be hired’).
The positive case is not particularly interesting, because the excluded middle is entailed
by the assertion However, when we negate the case above, and assume that the negation is
interpreted in situ above the attitude verb, then, under the assumption that this excluded mid-
dle inference projects through negation, from p¬think jq and pthink j(p)∨ think j(¬p)q we
can conclude pthink j(¬p)q. On both presuppositional and implicature approaches, the
excluded middle inference will project through negation as a default, but can also fail to
project, accounting for the availability of non-neg-raising readings (agnostic readings).
If we couple this approach with the Gajewski-Chierchia theory of strong NPIs (as
8 Another recent proposal treats neg-raising as arising from Homogeneity, we will not discuss this approach
here, see Križ 2015 for discussion.
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Romoli (2013) suggests), this approach predicts that strong NPIs are licensed under most
neg-raised predicates, but not under ‘like’-verbs, for the reasons we have already seen.9
The semantic approach to neg-raising can be extended to ‘like’-verbs, but requires
some tweaks. This has to do with the presuppositional nature of ‘like’-verbs (we’ll focus
on ‘like’, but everything we say here generalizes). Suppose that ‘like’ licenses an excluded
middle inference of the kind semantic approaches posit for neg-raising predicates. Then,
schematically, plikes f (p)q will license the inference to plikes f (p)∨ likes f (¬p)q. The prob-
lem is that, as we have seen, ‘likes’ presupposes the truth of its complement. On standard
theories of presupposition projection, (24-b) will then presuppose pp∧¬pq, leading to
incoherence.10 In other words, the excluded middle inference which is meant to do the heavy
lifting in semantic theories of neg-raising actually looks like it will be incoherent when the
predicate in question presupposes its complement.
There are, however, ways around this problem. One way is to assume that the excluded
middle inference of (23) should not be formulated as above, but as (25):
(25) likes f (p)∨dislikes f (p)
It is easy to see that once we combine p¬likes f (p)q with (25), we correctly predicted the
neg-raising inference pdislike f (p)q, without any problematic incoherent presuppositions.
In other words, on its most prominent reading, ‘Fred doesn’t like that Marie was hired
yesterday’ will be interpreted like ‘Fred dislikes that Marie was hired yesterday.’
One challenge for this approach, however, is what to do for verbs which do not
9 Note that adding an excluded middle inference does not block downward monotonicity properties, since
pthink j(p)∧ (think j(p)∨ think j(¬p))q entails pthink j(p∧ q)∧ (think j(p∧ q)∨ think j(¬(p∧ q)))q, as-
suming a standard quantificational semantics for ‘think’.
10 There is some controversy about how presuppositions project out of disjunction. On one approach (e.g. Geurts
1999), a disjunction presupposes everything which either disjunct presupposes; then obviously plikes f (p)∨
likes f (¬p)q will presuppose pp∧¬pq. On a different approach (e.g. Groenendijk et al. 1996), a disjunction
pp∨ qq presupposes the presuppositions of p, together with p¬p ⊃ rq , where r is the conjunction of the
presuppositions of q. On this approach, plikes f (p)∨ likes f (¬p)q presupposes pp∧ (¬likes f (p) ⊃ ¬p)q.
Together with the asserted content of p¬likes f (p)q, this will again entail pp∧¬pq.
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lexicalize a negative version − including other factive neg-raisers, like ‘appreciate’, as well
as non-factive neg-raisers like ‘want’ or ‘think’. One possibility is to entertain cognitively
accessible negative variants of each of these verbs even if these are not actually lexicalised
in a given language. A second challenge is that it is not clear how to derive these alternatives
in a principled way. These challenges require further exploration. It seems to us, however,
that some version of this approach is promising, and can make sense of the neg-raising
readings and NPI properties of ‘like’-verbs in a unified way.
Finally, notice that this approach readily generalises in principle to the cases with
nominal complement mentioned above in (14), thereby providing a unified account of
classical neg-raising cases and ‘like’-verbs, with sentential or nominal complements.
10 Conclusion
The Gajewski-Chierchia theory of strong NPI licensing predicts that, while neg-raising
predicates will typically license strong NPIs, there could be exceptions to this rule, if the
negated predicate has implicatures or presuppositions which block downward monotonicity
in its scope. ‘Like’-verbs have exactly this property, and, as predicted, do not license strong
NPIs. This is a striking fact which we believe provides support for the Gajewski-Chierchia
theory.
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